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Abstract
Background: In recent years a wide variety of epidemiological surveillance systems have been
developed to provide early identification of outbreaks of infectious disease. Each system has had its
own strengths and weaknesses. In 2002 a Working Group of the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) produced a framework for evaluation, which proved suitable for many public
health surveillance systems. However this did not easily adapt to the military setting, where by
necessity a variety of different parameters are assessed, different constraints placed on the systems,
and different objectives required. This paper describes a proposed framework for evaluation of
military syndromic surveillance systems designed to detect outbreaks of disease on operational
deployments.
Methods:  The new framework described in this paper was developed from the cumulative
experience of British and French military syndromic surveillance systems. The methods included a
general assessment framework (CDC), followed by more specific methods of conducting
evaluation. These included Knowledge/Attitude/Practice surveys (KAP surveys), technical audits,
ergonomic studies, simulations and multi-national exercises. A variety of military constraints
required integration into the evaluation. Examples of these include the variability of geographical
conditions in the field, deployment to areas without prior knowledge of naturally-occurring disease
patterns, the differences in field sanitation between locations and over the length of deployment,
the mobility of military forces, turnover of personnel, continuity of surveillance across different
locations, integration with surveillance systems from other nations working alongside each other,
compatibility with non-medical information systems, and security.
Results: A framework for evaluation has been developed that can be used for military surveillance
systems in a staged manner consisting of initial, intermediate and final evaluations. For each stage
of the process parameters for assessment have been defined and methods identified.
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Conclusion: The combined experiences of French and British syndromic surveillance systems
developed for use in deployed military forces has allowed the development of a specific evaluation
framework. The tool is suitable for use by all nations who wish to evaluate syndromic surveillance
in their own military forces. It could also be useful for civilian mobile systems or for national
security surveillance systems.
Background
Evaluation is a major issue for Public Health. Evaluation
involves fundamental judgements concerning a particular
intervention, based on a system providing scientifically
valid and socially legitimate information about the inter-
vention itself or its components [1]. Evaluation is particu-
larly important for the new generation of surveillance
systems. Since the 2001 attack on the World Trade Center
and other terrorist attacks, considerable efforts have been
made to develop syndromic surveillance systems, particu-
larly with the US, but also in Europe. In the face of the
heightened risk of bioterrorism, the main objective of
these systems is to provide early warning of potential out-
breaks, enabling the authorities to react rapidly. The
importance of evaluating such systems quickly became
apparent [2]. Several evaluations of such systems have
been performed. However, these evaluations have rarely
used validated and standardised methodologies. A frame-
work for the evaluation of civilian syndromic surveillance
systems was created by the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) of Atlanta in 2003 [3] and revised
in 2004 [4]. This framework was developed to evaluate
whether such systems attain their objectives, and to pro-
vide information for further development and improve-
ment.
Since the meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisa-
tion (NATO) in 2002 [5], armed forces have also begun to
develop syndromic surveillance systems, with their own
objectives and procedures, adapted to missions and
engagement conditions during operations. The main
objectives of these systems are the early detection of
potential epidemics, evaluation of their potential impact
on operational capacity and the provision of information
to facilitate the medical response. Military syndromic sur-
veillance systems must take into account medical, techno-
logical, human and organisational aspects potentially
very different from those considered in civilian systems.
Since 2002, the French (FR) armed forces have been devel-
oping a syndromic surveillance system, the système de sur-
veillance spatiale des épidémies au sein des forces armées en
Guyane (2SE FAG). ThIS prototype of syndromic surveil-
lance was developed at the Institut de Médecine Tropicale du
service de santé des armées (IMTSSA) in Marseilles, in col-
laboration with the Université de la Méditerranée in Mar-
seilles and the Institut Pasteur de la Guyane in Cayenne.
This system has been in use among French armed forces in
French Guiana since 2004 [6].
After the first Gulf war in 1991, the UK armed forces
began developing the Prototype Remote Illness and
Symptom Monitor (PRISM). This system was imple-
mented during employment of the UK contingent in Iraq
in 2003, but the experiment was deemed a failure and the
system was taken out of operation in 2004. Evaluation of
this system led to the creation of a new system, the Real-
time Medical Surveillance (RMS) system, which is cur-
rently being developed further.
These systems have provided invaluable insight into the
specific aspects and requirements of military syndromic
surveillance systems and their evaluation. Building on this
experience, we developed a new method for evaluating
military syndromic surveillance systems, which is
described here.
The objective of this study was to describe a new frame-
work for evaluating military surveillance systems for the
early detection of outbreaks on duty areas.
Methods
A specific evaluation method adapted to military syndro-
mic surveillance objectives and conditions of engagement
in the field was developed. This method was used to eval-
uate the FR 2SE FAG and UK PRISM and RMS systems.
French and British military syndromic surveillance systems
2SE FAG (table 1) was set up in French Guiana to comple-
ment the mandatory surveillance system, which was used
as the reference during the final evaluation of the system
[7]. This system is based on two independent networks
working together: a recording network, situated in French
Guiana, and an analysis network, situated in both French
Guiana and mainland France. The recording network is
based on the input of health-related information into the
system by general practitioners, nurses and paramedics.
Various electronic input methods (PC, PDA, GPS and sat-
ellite communication tools) may be used, depending on
the situation. The data is then analysed by an analysis net-
work, the communauté de services pour la surveillance syn-
dromique  (CS3). This results in the production of
automated dashboards which display health information
to be used directly by commanders, defining automati-BMC Public Health 2008, 8:146 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/8/146
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cally 3 levels of situation: normal situation, pre-alarm sit-
uation and alarm situation. This system is currently
designed for use in fever surveillance, in an intertropical
area affected by many febrile tropical diseases, including
dengue fever and malaria. Right from the initial develop-
ment of this system, an evaluation strategy has been used
to evaluate its efficacy and to improve its functioning
before its widespread implementation throughout the
French armed forces.
PRISM (table 1), together with the use of PDA and satellite
communication systems, was designed to facilitate the
surveillance of many different types of symptom among
military personnel: fever, cardiac, neurological, respira-
tory, gastrological and dermatological symptoms. Data
were sent from the theatre of action to the analysis centre
within the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory
(DSTL) at Porton Down. These data were then integrated
into a Geographical Information System (GIS) and statis-
tical analysis was carried out in DSTL, generating results in
a form easily accessible to commanders. It was necessary
to define what constituted an alarm for this system.
Despite its overall failure, the evaluation of PRISM paved
the way for the development of RMS, which has yet to be
formally evaluated.
Functioning of military syndromic surveillance and 
evaluation parameters
Several stages were necessary in the development and
evaluation of military surveillance systems, as shown in
figure 1. From the initial analysis to the results, several
evaluation parameters in addition to those of the general
CDC assessment framework were studied: 1) Pertinence –
the link between objectives and the preliminary assess-
ment; 2) Feasibility – the extent to which the available
means meet needs; 3) Operationality – functioning condi-
tions in the field; 4) Coherence – the link between the dif-
ferent components and the development stages; 5)
Efficacy – the extent to which the initial objectives are
achieved; 6) Efficiency – the link between the resources
implemented and the results and 7) Impact – all effects
other than the results.
The functioning step was detailed, with careful study of
the process of information circulation and use and of the
corresponding evaluation parameters (figure 2). The fol-
lowing additional factors were also studied: 1) Timeliness,
assessing the time taken to detect a potential epidemic
and to provide commanders with the relevant informa-
tion; 2) Validity, assessing the system's ability to detect
real outbreaks; 3) Quality of data, providing information
about the completeness of recorded data; 4) Usefulness,
measuring the contribution of the system to the early
detection of an epidemic and its ability to provide infor-
mation to facilitate efficient intervention; 5) Flexibility,
measuring the system's ability to adapt to a change in
environmental conditions, such as the emergence of a dis-
ease causing an epidemic (emergent disease) or significant
changes in the population; 6) Acceptability, assessing the
willingness of users to be involved in the operation of the
system; 7) Portability, evaluating the possible use of the
system in other circumstances or at a different location; 8)
Table 1: Main characteristics of the French (2SE FAG) and British (PRISM and RMS) military syndromic surveillance systems
2SE FAG PRISM RMS
Nationality French British British
Year begun 2002 1991 2005
Year ended -2 0 0 4-
Recorded data for patients Specific list of symptoms * Specific list of symptoms * Specific list of symptoms *
Person responsible for data 
input
Military general practitioner or 
nurse
Military personnel (not from 
health service)
Military personnel (not from 
health service)
Support for input PC or PDA ** PDA PDA
Data transmission Telephone link Communication 
satellite
Communication satellite Communication satellite
Automatization of data 
analysis
Automated Not automated Not automated
Method of data analysis CPEG, EWMA ** - -
Synthesis for commanders Real-time automated indicators No indicators Non-automated indicators
Feed-back for actors In real time - Weekly
Evaluation programme Before, during and after 
deployment
- Before, during and after 
deployment
2SE FAG: "Système de surveillance en temps réel au sein des forces armées en Guyane"
PRISM: Prototype Remote Illness and Symptom Monitor
RMS: Real-time Medical Surveillance
* The specific lists of symptoms are different for the French and British systems
** PC: Personal computer, PDA: Personal digital assistant
*** CPEG: Current/past experience graph, EWMA: Exponential weighted moving averageBMC Public Health 2008, 8:146 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/8/146
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Stability, reflecting the reaction of the system to a change
in the variables recorded; 9) Financial assessment, dealing
with installation and running costs and the calculation of
cost-efficacy and cost-benefit ratios.
These evaluation parameters take into account the current
constraints facing armed forces in conditions of engage-
ment, and concern mostly variability in the geographical
location of missions and the possibility of deployment in
locations for which no sanitary data are available. The
high mobility of forces within a theatre, the permanent
turnover of soldiers, stress and difficult work conditions
in the field, the multinational character of current mis-
sions, the necessity of the functioning system to be abso-
lutely permanent and to continue to operate for long
periods of time in many different areas, particularly at the
start of deployment, were also important issues. Other
issues included the diffuse geographical distribution of
those involved in surveillance, compatibility between the
surveillance system and the information systems used by
commanders and the high level of security required for
both military and medical data.
Other military characteristics and core evaluation 
methods
The evaluation method for military systems was devel-
oped around the three steps classically used in evaluation
(figure 3) [8]. The initial evaluation ensures that the sys-
The development steps for a syndromic surveillance system and their evaluation parameters Figure 1
The development steps for a syndromic surveillance system and their evaluation parameters.
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tem has a solid basis and is entirely coherent. It leads to
the creation of an evaluation program, for which it condi-
tions the modes of decision-making, follow-up and over-
all activities. Intermediate evaluations are required to
monitor and correct actions. These evaluations check the
dynamics of actions, reorienting them towards their ini-
tial objectives. Final evaluation assesses the system and its
effects, making it possible to analyse, interpret and use the
results and providing an appraisal of the extent to which
the system was successful and data for current and future
enhancement of the system.
We focused on technical aspects. The development of a
secure architecture for the recording, notification and
analysis of information is one of the first problems that
must be tackled for any new system. This architecture
encompasses the entire surveillance process, from data
acquisition to the issuing of an alarm. For military sys-
tems, maximum flexibility must be combined with the
highest level of security. It must also be possible to adapt
the capacity of the system to demand, maintaining some
redundancy so that the system can be modified whilst still
operational. Technical audits, based on quality assurance
methods[9], were used to study functioning and security.
The permanence of the system is a key requirement and
evaluation. Regular intrusion tests were performed and we
also tried to block the system by supplying it with exces-
sive amounts of data.
We also assessed the ergonomics of the system, taking into
account all modes of intervention, with adaptation to dif-
ferent types of armed forces and deployment. Several
Epidemiological information circulation and use and the corresponding evaluation parameters during the functioning of a mili- tary syndromic surveillance system Figure 2
Epidemiological information circulation and use and the corresponding evaluation parameters during the 
functioning of a military syndromic surveillance system.
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types of study were used to study ergonomics, and these
studies concerned both hardware and software. The focus
group method was used for the analysis of tasks and activ-
ities [10]. The cognitive walkthrough method [11] was
used for precise analysis of the actions taken. In this anal-
ysis, the reactions of new users of the system were ana-
lysed, together with their opinions. Software interfaces
were analysed (size, colour and type of character, drop-
down menus, etc.) with the Bastien, Scapin and Nogier
criteria [12]. The UML method [13] was also used to for-
malize and to describe each task and the overall activity of
the system precisely.
We also carried out a specific evaluation of the users of the
recording network. Even if the architecture of the system
is technologically successful, a surveillance system works
only if the users of the system have understood the issues
involved and the objectives of the system, know how to
use the tools to carry out their tasks and periodically
receive significant feedback. Knowledge, attitudes and
practice surveys (KAP) were used for this evaluation. This
type of survey can be used to evaluate factors following a
specific questionnaire and face-to-face interviews with all
or a sample of stakeholders. The questionnaire was tested
in a pilot study, on a small sample of the population
before the study began.
The actors of the evaluation were some actors of the sys-
tem, university or institutional partners or came from
external organisms. They were military and civilian. They
were specialists in epidemiological surveillance or its eval-
uation.
Schematic representation of the proposed framework for evaluating military surveillance systems for the early detection of  outbreaks on tours of duty Figure 3
Schematic representation of the proposed framework for evaluating military surveillance systems for the 
early detection of outbreaks on tours of duty.
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The CDC reference framework [4] was used for the evalu-
ation of 2SE FAG. This framework explores a number of
different areas and performances in different functions.
The first part of the survey involves a description of the
system, its objectives and operational aspects and a
detailed presentation of the stakeholders. The second part
evaluates the potential of the system to detect an out-
break. The third part assesses the experiences of the users
of the system. This approach required the creation of a
database and of a specific questionnaire for 2SE FAG
stakeholders.
The timeliness of the systems was assessed by simulating
an outbreak of aggressive or natural biological agents.
These techniques were applied to the French and British
systems separately, but were also applied to these two sys-
tems used together during a NATO exercise, with a simu-
lation of dysentery and anthrax outbreaks. This type of
exercise also provided the best opportunity for evaluating
the interoperability of the systems.
Results
We carried out a global appraisal of the evaluations of 2SE
FAG, PRISM and RMS. This made it possible to propose a
new evaluation framework for evaluating military surveil-
lance systems for the early detection of outbreaks on duty
areas.
Evaluations of 2SE FAG (table 2 and figure 4)
Two military epidemiologists carried out an initial evalu-
ation in October 2004. A survey, including standardised
face-to-face interviews identified no initial system issues.
Schematic representation of the specificities of military surveillance and their connection with evaluation parameters (assessed  by 2SE FAG = 1, by PRISM = 2, by RMS = 3) studied with the general evaluation framework and specific methods Figure 4
Schematic representation of the specificities of military surveillance and their connection with evaluation 
parameters (assessed by 2SE FAG = 1, by PRISM = 2, by RMS = 3) studied with the general evaluation frame-
work and specific methods.
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Only 20% of health facilities were equipped with comput-
ers and only 12% of users were regularly using a PDA. This
evaluation led to improvements in computerisation and
the adoption of a training programme. A final evaluation
programme was subsequently carried out.
Intermediate evaluations were carried out between 2004
and 2007. Two technical audits were performed in 2006
and 2007, an exercise simulating the release of an aggres-
sive biological agent was carried out in 2005, ergonomics
studies were carried out in 2005 and 2006, a KAP survey
was carried out in 2006 and the multinational NATO
"Disease Surveillance System Experiment" exercise was
carried out in 2006, with British, American and Canadian
partners. These evaluations were carried out by civilian
and military personnel from organisations such as the
Institut de Santé Publique, d'Epidémiologie et de Développe-
ment  (ISPED) in Bordeaux, France, and the Supreme
Allied Command Transformation (SACT) in Norfolk,
USA. These evaluations, together with constant supervi-
sion, made possible the modification and regular
improvement of the system. The frequency of PDA use
was found to be 21.1%, and the use of such systems has
now been ceased [14]. Stakeholders were knowledgeable,
with 89.5% understanding the functioning and main
objectives of the system, despite the dispensation of spe-
cific training to only 57% after arrival in French Guiana
[14]. The recording software was considered easy to use by
73.7% of those questioned [15]. Extensive modifications
were made to this software, the training program, the
feedback system and the indicators supplied to com-
manders, as a direct result of these evaluations. The simu-
lation exercise was used to evaluate timeliness, and
demonstrated that an outbreak could be detected within
30 minutes. The NATO exercise also showed 2SE FAG to
have a high level of interoperability, as demonstrated by
Table 2: Evaluation methods used for the French (2SE FAG) and British (PRISM and RMS) military syndromic surveillance systems and 
their main results
2SE FAG PRISM RMS
Evaluation 
programme
Existing Non-existent Existing
IE
Methods Survey of data input personnel during deployment 
of the prototype (French Guiana, 2004)
Technical audit on a prototype 
(exercise in Oman, 1991)
Multinational exercise 
(Afghanistan, 2006)
Actors 2SE FAG team PRISM team RMS team SACT team
Results Improvement of computerisation Adaptation of the 
training programme Building of the evaluation 
programme
Improved technical functioning Development of analysis method
INTE
Methods Simulation exercise (2005) Ergonomic studies 
(2005–2006) KAP survey (2006) Multinational 
exercise (Afghanistan, 2006) Technical audits 
(2006–2007)
Evaluation of data input personnel 
activities
-
Actors 2SE FAG team ISPED SACT team PRISM team
Results Continuous improvement process Evolution of 
recording software Cessation of PDA use in the 
field Development of analysis method Adaptation 
of indicators for commanders
Compliance rate of 10% for data 
input personnel
FE
Methods CDC framework Simulation exercise General audit (2004) -
Actors LSTM PRISM team PRISM team 2SE FAG team
Results Lessons for generalisation of the system (2SE DJIB 
and others)
Lessons for development of RMS
2SE FAG: "Système de surveillance en temps réel au sein des forces armées en Guyane"
2SE DJIB: Système de surveillance en temps réel au sein des forces françaises à Djibouti"
PRISM: Prototype Remote Illness and Symptom Monitor
RMS: Real-time Medical Surveillance
IE: initial evaluation, INTE: intermediate evaluation, FE: final evaluation
KAP: Knowledge, Attitude and Practice
SACT: Supreme Allied Command Transformation (NATO)
ISPED: Institut de Santé Publique, Epidémiologie et Développement
LSTM: Liverpool School of Tropical MedicineBMC Public Health 2008, 8:146 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/8/146
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the ease with which it was integrated into a multinational
exercise network and sent French health data, in an appro-
priate format, to the multinational joint staff. This system
was capable of detecting an anthrax outbreak within two
hours and proposing appropriate measures to counter the
disease [16]. This method of regular evaluation coupled
with constant, rapid change has resulted in a dynamic sys-
tem displaying continual operational improvement.
A final evaluation, based on the CDC framework, was car-
ried out in 2007, in collaboration with the Liverpool
School of Tropical Medicine (LSTM) and the Communica-
ble Disease Control Unit of the Defence Medical Services
Department (DMSD), UK [7]. Timeliness was shown to be
excellent: the mean time between the first contact of a
patient with the health system and the integration of his
data into indicator format was estimated at 30 to 60 min-
utes. However, 16% of the stakeholders said that they did
not carry out necessary tasks; acceptability therefore
remains a serious issue. Assessments of validity showed
that the system detected dengue fever outbreaks more
effectively than malaria epidemics [7]. The usefulness of
the system was demonstrated in 2006, during a major out-
break of dengue fever [17,18], but the lack of permanent
system records made it impossible to quantify this useful-
ness. The reliability of the system was another problem,
with 68% of stakeholders reporting that the system was
sometimes unavailable, mainly for technical reasons.
Based on this evaluation, the generalisation of the 2SE
FAG system to all French military units on deployment
was recommended. This evaluation also showed that the
CDC framework was not entirely appropriate for the eval-
uation of military systems because it did not assess all the
factors specifically important in a military context (e.g.
interoperability, security, population turnover, high
mobility, etc.). The proposed evaluation assesses these
factors through other specific methods (figure 4).
Results of evaluations of PRISM and RMS (table 2 and 
figure 4)
An initial evaluation of PRISM was carried out during an
exercise in Oman in 2001, before the use of this system in
a real armed forces deployment. This evaluation made it
possible to improve the software, particularly for case
recording. In 2003, PRISM was implemented within the
UK contingent in Iraq, and 200 PDA were deployed. Data
were transferred to the DSTL and then to the Communica-
ble Disease Control Unit of the DMSD. No evaluation was
performed in the field. After several months of use, an
intermediate evaluation showed that only 10% of the
users were actively using the system, as only 20 PDA had
sent any data. Furthermore, the DSTL had no data-based
threshold defining an alarm situation for a given symp-
tom. The information generated was therefore of no oper-
ational use to commanders. PRISM was abandoned in
2004. A final evaluation was carried out to determine the
causes of this failure. This evaluation was carried out by
British and French partners, within the framework of a
bilateral technical agreement for the development of mil-
itary real-time surveillance. The poor acceptability of the
system to military units was only one of several problems:
these units had been deployed with no specific PRISM
training programme, it was impossible for the organisers
to supervise the use of the system during deployment in
Iraq and the information supplied by the DSTL could not
be used in its original format (list of number codes) and
could not be used to generate operational indicators for
commanders without significant formatting. It was there-
fore impossible for the Communicable Disease Control
Unit of DMSD to analyse the data as this unit did not have
the required biostatistical skills or available information.
Many necessary improvements to system architecture,
types and skills of stakeholders, tasks to be accomplished,
and general system functioning were identified as a result.
RMS was set up in 2005, building on the experience
gained from PRISM. A new architecture was defined, new
partners, such as the Colindale Centre for Infections,
joined the team and a new organisation concept was
developed. Analytical capacities were developed, making
it possible to generate operational information for view-
ing by commanders. This system is still being developed
but was used in the NATO "Disease Surveillance System
Experiment" exercise in 2006. During this exercise, this
system took 24 hours to detect the anthrax outbreak,
whereas the FR 2SE FAG system required only two hours
[16].
Proposal of a framework for evaluating military 
surveillance systems for the early detection of outbreaks 
on tours of duty
Our proposed new evaluation framework is summarised
in figure 3. An initial evaluation is essential before or dur-
ing the first deployment of a system or its prototype. At
this point, coherence, pertinence, immediate acceptabil-
ity, feasibility, and interoperability should be assessed.
Those responsible for this evaluation must be deployed
simultaneously with the system. The methods used in our
evaluation framework are mostly surveys, with face-to-
face interviews based on questionnaires and participation
in a multinational exercise. This initial evaluation should
be used to correct any problems identified and to create a
formal evaluation program, with a detailed agenda.
Several intermediate evaluations should then be per-
formed and any abnormalities should be rapidly cor-
rected, to ensure continuous improvement. At this point,
the dynamics of functioning, intermediate efficacy, opera-
tionality and coherence should be assessed. Various meth-
ods can be used for this assessment. A specific evaluationBMC Public Health 2008, 8:146 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/8/146
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is required, focusing on those responsible for data record-
ing, for which KAP surveys are ideal. Simulation exercises
can be used to evaluate timeliness, sensitivity and specifi-
city. Regular technical audits are required to check the
functioning and back-up of the system and to ensure that
the highest levels of security are maintained. Studies of
ergonomics should focus on the enhancement of human-
computer interfaces to improve their acceptability. At this
point, participation in a multinational exercise would also
be useful, for the assessment of interoperability. Military
or civilian experts may be responsible for these evalua-
tions.
The final evaluation is essential. It should be carried out at
the end of a prototype phase (as with 2SE FAG), at the end
of deployment in a theatre of action or when a system
ceases to be used (as with PRISM). At this point, efficacy,
timeliness, validity, sensitivity, specificity, data quality,
usefulness, portability, stability and reliability should be
assessed. A study of costs, efficiency, impact and interop-
erability should also be carried out. The reference method
for the final evaluation is the CDC framework, adapted to
the specific characteristics of the military environment. If
a deployment or mission is too long, this method could
also be used after several months or years of functioning.
A multinational exercise could again be useful at this
stage. The final evaluation is expected to generate conclu-
sions and recommendations allowing the generalisation
of the system or allowing its use for another deployment,
following adoption of the proposed corrections and
improvements.
Discussion
The French and British armed forces have acquired exper-
tise in the area of syndromic surveillance, through their
2SE FAG, PRISM and RMS projects. The evaluation of
these projects has become a priority, because only a valid
evaluation method can provide useful information for the
generalisation of such systems to all armed forces on duty
areas.
The two countries have had different experiences in terms
of evaluation. The UK armed forces developed their sys-
tem without a viable evaluation program. As a result, it
was not possible to identify and correct anomalies. This
resulted in the failure of the PRISM system. If a robust
evaluation method had been implemented during the
development of PRISM, the system might have been more
successful. However, the final evaluation did lead to the
identification of errors and lessons were learnt from this
experience, improving the development of RMS. The eval-
uation of RMS was incorporated into the development
programme from the start, and evaluations will be carried
out for each stage of development. The use of RMS in the
NATO exercise demonstrated that these methods have led
to considerable improvement.
French experts were able to analyse the failure of PRISM
before embarking on their own project, because the Brit-
ish and French projects were not developed over the same
time period. The French team considered evaluation to be
a major issue from the outset. Since the start of 2SE FAG
development in 2002, a structured evaluation method has
been used to ensure continuous improvement to the sys-
tem, with unbiased observers evaluating the value of this
surveillance system to the armed forces. Many civilian
experts have therefore been involved in the operational
evaluation of 2SE FAG, making it possible to modify and
adapt the system. Without these methods, 2SE FAG might
have suffered the same fate as PRISM. The 2SE FAG proto-
type phase has just been completed and, the usefulness of
this system having being demonstrated, the Joint Staff has
decided to continue its use within the armed forces in
French Guiana and to install this system in Djibouti,
under the name 2SE DJIB. All this work is a part of a more
general system: Alerte et surveillance en temps reel (ASTER).
Evaluation has played a major role in improvements to
2SE FAG and the creation of 2SE DJIB. The method we
propose here is currently being used to evaluate 2SE DJIB.
The framework proposed in 2004 by the CDC [4] has
proved a useful tool. Several American and British teams
have evaluated their systems with this framework, and
have produced recommendations to improve function-
ing, as for ESSENCE [19] and NHS Direct [20]. This frame-
work has also been used to evaluate 2SE FAG [21], but was
found to be of limited use in this cases, as it was not
adapted to the specific needs of the armed forces on duty.
We propose new tools and studies for evaluating all
aspects of the use of this system in armed forces on
deployment.
The lack of epidemics due to bioterrorism agents limits
opportunities for evaluating syndromic surveillance sys-
tems. Outbreaks of natural agents can be studied, such as
dengue and malaria for 2SE FAG and influenza for other
systems [22,23]. Alternatively outbreaks due to aggressive
agents may be simulated, as for 2SE FAG and RMS. Such
simulations have already been carried out, for anthrax,
using a specific epidemic simulation model [24]. Other
simulation models have been developed, including one
simulating an outbreak of anthrax due to inhalation after
the release of this agent in an aerosol [25]. Simulation has
also been used to compare statistical methods for early
detection, such as the "SaTScan trade mark" and "small
area regression and testing scores" (SMART) methods
[26].BMC Public Health 2008, 8:146 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/8/146
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Another important issue is collaboration with external
partners. The active involvement of the French armed
forces in the evaluation of PRISM, the participation of
SACT in the evaluation of both 2SE FAG and RMS, and the
participation of ISPED, LSTM and DMSD in the evalua-
tion of 2SE FAG have all led to the overall improvement
of these systems.
The involvement of commanders in the evaluation pro-
gramme is a major issue. Each evaluation process costs
money and takes time, and therefore represents a signifi-
cant burden. The surveys are impossible to organise with-
out authorisation from the commanders, who must
therefore understand the benefits of operational surveil-
lance systems providing essential information outlining
the most appropriate course of action in the theatre of
action. The challenge is to provide non-medical decision-
makers with appropriate information, in a form that is
easy to understand and can be used directly. This has been
achieved with the 2SE FAG indicators (with coloured indi-
cators for alarm level, risk maps and a summary of the
main results), which are updated in real time, but not with
PRISM. This evaluation system is of potential interest to
the entire public health community, as it can present pub-
lic health information in a format that individuals from
outside the field of public health can understand and act
on in an informed manner.
The proposed evaluation method provides a complete,
global evaluation of military syndromic surveillance sys-
tems. Additional methods could be included for the eval-
uation of specific parts of the system. For example, a
recent study evaluated the utility of ICD 9 codes for the
ESSENCE system [27].
Conclusion
This proposed evaluation method should allow other
countries potentially interested in the development of
real-time surveillance within their armed forces to benefit
from the experience of the British and French armed
forces. As it is impossible to predict the time and the loca-
tion of future deployments, this evaluation method was
designed to be used directly.
Evaluation remains the weakest link in the public health
chain. The method proposed here makes it possible to
improve military surveillance systems, which have been
shown to be essential. It could be also useful for mobile
civilian systems or for national security surveillance sys-
tems.
It should be borne in mind that real-time surveillance sys-
tems are simply a source of information, raising the alarm
and assisting decision-makers in the complex task of man-
aging the health situation. Surveillance is only one of a
battery of decision-making aids for medical experts. Oth-
ers include medical intelligence, epidemiological investi-
gations and prediction of the progression of the
phenomena observed. All these decision support systems
require improvement through rigorous evaluation.
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